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5.1  Introduction 
We define populism as an approach that emphasizes income redistribution 
by government expenditures and income policies and deemphasizes the prob- 
lems of deficit financing and inflation. The question analyzed here is whether 
populist governments can stop high inflation.  If  they can, developing nations 
like Argentina might be able to grow again. If they cannot, stagnation and the 
risk of hyperinflation seem the natural outcome. 
Argentina’s efforts to stop high inflation are almost permanent, and the last 
decades are full of attempts to stabilize prices. Attempts were made by popu- 
lists,  liberals, and  conservative  governments,  by  military dictatorships  and 
democratic governments. Analyzing some major economic policies of the last 
decade, this paper will try to explain why stabilization has not been success- 
ful. It also will explain why a change in the populist stance is necessary but 
not the only condition needed to achieve stabilization. 
An important attempt by a populist government started in 1985. Known by 
the name “Austral Plan,” because of the new legal currency introduced, it tried 
to put an abrupt end to inflation. The plan failed, and it could not be rescued 
in spite of a variety of policy measures implemented by the government. 
Another attempt  was the Primavera Plan,  which  also failed.  It started in 
1988 and was the prelude to the hyperinflation of 1989 and 1990. Section 5.2 
of this paper deals with these two experiences. 
Section 5.3 explains the process of hyperinflation  and the measures under- 
taken to control it. Section 5.4 describes the first plan of the new administra- 
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tion that took power after the resignation of President Alfonsin, who felt him- 
self unable to manage the economic crisis. 
Section 5.5  discusses two major items of monetary theory related to high 
inflation that I believe to be highly relevant for Argentina. One of these items 
is the phenomenon known as “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic” (Sargent and 
Wallace 198  1) and refers to the policy dilemma of the government that must 
decide how to finance the deficit and has no other choices than printing money 
or bonds. 
The other issue is the problem known as the “time consistency of the opti- 
mal plans”; in Argentina this is related to the policy dilemma of debt repudia- 
tion through hyperinflation or forced debt restructuring. Auernheimer ( 1974) 
was the first to notice the impact on government finance of  repudiation of 
money with price jumps. Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978) for- 
malized and extended the discussion, and Lucas and Stokey (1983) raised the 
issue of debt term structure and time consistency. Finally, section 5.6 contains 
concluding remarks. 
5.2  Stabilization Attempts 
5.2.1  The Austral Plan 
The Austral Plan was organized around three basic measures. First, prices 
of  public sector enterprises were increased to reduce their cash flow deficit. 
Second, all prices, public and private, were frozen at the level prevailing on 
14 June 1985. For some sectors, however, prices were frozen at the level they 
had held some weeks before 14 June. This occurred because there had been 
some anticipation of price controls, and several firms (if not all) increased 
prices accordingly. Third, the president promised in a public speech that, from 
14 June on, the Central Bank would not print any money to finance public- 
sector operations. 
A few days after this announcement the plan was accepted by  the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF). It essentially respected the monetary and fiscal 
targets of the standby agreement reached in the previous week; even more, it 
was said that the plan set more ambitious targets than those agreed upon with 
the IMF. 
Besides freezing prices and salaries, as well as public service prices (after 
upward adjustments), the Austral Plan included exchange control and banking 
system control with a regulating scheme of the main financial activities. For- 
eign trade regulations and the general level of  protection were left without 
major modifications. 
Before the Austral Plan, the economic conditions were very worrying, with 
an accelerating rate of inflation that reached levels of 30% a month and with 
big fears that the process should turn into a hyperinflation. Although this was 
foreseen by  the community as a serious hyperinflation risk, price increases 123  What Have Populists Learned from Hyperinflation’? 
were more the result of private agents’ anticipation of  price control than the 
result of a fiscal and monetary overflow. 
The prevailing high inflation rates and the anticipation of  changing govern- 
ment policies affected expectations. High expected inflation spread all across 
the economy in high nominal interest  rates,  indexation  schemes, and in all 
types  of  contracts with  deferred payments. If  a sudden  stabilization  would 
occur, unanticipated lower inflation would cause a problem to all nonindexed 
contracts. 
To take account of unanticipated  lower inflation, the Austral Plan took the 
legal provisions of  adjusting contracts by means of a schedule contemplating 
the difference between the old expected inflation and the new expected infla- 
tion supposedly generated by the stabilization plan. This measure did not have 
any direct  implication  for the working or dynamics of the stabilization pro- 
gram by itself. The measure just tended to avoid unexpected wealth transfers 
under the assumption that the plan would be successful. 
Although high real interest rates and concentration on short-term maturities 
reflected  a lack of credibility, the Austral Plan started with favorable public 
opinion, at a popular level at least. The popular support of the plan can be 
interpreted in one of two ways. First, the public may have accepted the stabi- 
lization plan as a reasonable approach to stop inflation. Or, second, the public 
did not know what a reasonable approach was, but accepted the plan anyway 
because it approved of the government’s decision to give serious consideration 
to the problem of inflation. (Before the Austral Plan, the monthly rate of infla- 
tion had more than doubled from December 1983 to June 1985, reaching 42% 
in the latter month.) 
The mass media (much of which was directly controlled by the state) adver- 
tised the Austral Plan and produced a favorable effect on general expectations; 
an abrupt fall in prices and free interest rates followed. 
The favorable impact created by the government’s advertising did not last, 
nor did the favorable public opinion. The lack of fiscal discipline-in  con- 
junction  with  unsound  monetary  management-accelerated  inflation  in 
1986-87 to an average level of nearly 10%  per month. Interest rates for loans 
denominated in australs increased to reflect expected inflation, and domestic 
interest rates for operations in U.S. dollars reflected an important element of 
country risk. 
Interest rates for operations in U.S. dollars were about four times the Lon- 
don Interbank  Offer Rate (LIBOR). This high rate reflected  the poor credit 
assessment by foreign creditors, who, unable to collect any payments, lacked 
alternatives other than restructuring most of Argentina’s external debt. For the 
first time in the twentieth century Argentina decided to ignore the reputation 
effect of debt restructuring. 
The consequences of the Austral Plan lasted for several years. The credibil- 
ity  of  the  government’s  announcements was  low  and  became  even  lower. 
There grew in the mind of the citizenry the idea that populist democracy had 124  Roque B. Fernandez 
Table 5.1  Argentina: Per-capita GNP and Real Wages 
Per-capita GNP  Real Wages 
Real Australs 
Year  (1970 = 100)  Real U.S. Dollars  Minimum Wage  General Average 
1984  96.0  2,883.5  89.4  95.2 
I985  90.3  2,710.6  64.6  81.7 
1986  93.8  2,815.7  78.2  83.5 
1987  94.3  2,829.8  72.9  76.9 
1988  90.0  2,701.9  48.7  66.3 
1989  84.7  2,542.5  46.3  60.0 
Source: Carta Econornica. 
Note: GNP is measured with real U.S. dollars from the third quarter of  1989. Real Wage is an 
index with the base January 1984 = 100. 
failed again. Most important, the economic standard of living of low-income 
people-the  group to whom populist governments are said to pay special at- 
tention-deteriorated  or remained at the same level of the previous decade. 
Table 5.1 illustrates this last point for the  six-year period  corresponding  to 
Alfonsin’s presidency. 
Although the Austral Plan was presented and discussed in the media as a 
“new” approach to stabilization, it contained hardly anything new. It followed 
the traditional  income-policy  approach. The only  exception was the  public 
commitment of a populist president to stop the monetary emission to finance 
public-sector  operations.  For the first time in Argentina’s history a populist 
president sounded like his archenemies, the monetarists. 
The traditional  approach  to stabilization in Argentina was to announce a 
program of fiscal discipline plus price controls; the traditional result was in- 
creasing inflation  after a short period of stabilization. The Austral Plan con- 
firmed this tradition,  since, after a few months, inflation accelerated again, 
this time reaching a two-digit monthly rate by the beginning of  1988. 
Those who elaborated the plan, and were in charge of managing it, believed 
that stabilization was a necessary precondition to discussing the reform of the 
public sector that would lead to a sound and permanent monetary and fiscal 
policy. 
Those who did not share the heterodox view of stabilization were doubtful 
about the real possibility of this approach and believed that the transformation 
of public-sector enterprises and the institutional behavior of  local and provin- 
cial governments  were both prerequisites to stabilization. The failure of Ar- 
gentina’s  Austral  Plan  seemed to confirm  this  last  interpretation.  President 
Alfonsin-who  resigned  five months  before  the constitutional  date for the 
change of governments-acknowledged  his failure to take the necessary ac- 
tions to reform the public sector. 
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sector operations was not honored.  The Banco Hipotecario Nacional  (Mort- 
gage National  Bank) spent almost $5 billion  (U.S. dollars) in concessional 
loans presumably related to the political campaign. Another $2 billion were 
granted to countries with poor credit ratings like Cuba, Nicaragua, and some 
African countries, presumably to support the Argentine chancellor as Secre- 
tary to the U.N. General Assembly. The loans were granted in domestic cur- 
rency to be used in purchasing domestic goods. These two operations alone 
meant more than doubling the monetary base. 
As fiscal discipline was not achieved with the Austral Plan, deficits forced 
the government  to borrow  from different  sources to close the  budget.  One 
source of financing was monetary creation by the Central Bank. To sterilize 
part of the monetary  emission, the Central Bank  increased  reserve require- 
ments, paying competitive interest rates on them. 
This disguised borrowing eventually resulted in a dominant force that drove 
the hyperinflation of mid-1989, a subject I will discuss later. First, I will dis- 
cuss some complementary policy actions that attempted to rescue the Austral 
Plan from total failure. 
MazzorinS Chickens and Other Heterodox Measures 
Complementing the Austral Plan 
During 1987 the government undertook some policy actions to complement 
the  Austral  Plan. Some policies  were a repetition  of  previous  policies,  but 
another was new. 
The repeated policies were a new price freeze plus discretionary authoriza- 
tions  to increase  prices  up  to  10%  for  some  items.  Authorizations  were 
granted to those items that did not violate special price schedules elaborated 
by Secretary of Commerce Mazzorin. 
Price controls did not work, and the economic authorities decided to take 
more direct actions to stop inflation. Somehow they imagined that increasing 
the supply of foodstuffs would stop inflation.  One way of increasing  it was 
importing chicken. So Mazzorin-spending  additional government money in 
a deficit-ridden country-imported  several tons of chicken. Unfortunately, he 
imported the wrong kind of chicken. Argentineans refused  to consume im- 
ported chickens fed with anything except corn from the pampas. 
Even  with  a gradual decrease in chicken prices,  consumers did not  want 
them.  Especially  when  the  chickens  started  to smell bad.  Rotten chickens 
were the final outcome of Mazzorin’s stabilization strategy. He imported too 
many chickens in proportion to the taste and freezing capacity of the consum- 
ers in Argentina. 
Inflation  did not  fall, neither,  in  the  long  run,  did  the  relative  price  of 
chicken. In the short run, the demand for chicken fell because people reduced 
their consumption of chicken in restaurants and other places where they might 
have purchased “elaborated” chickens.  They were afraid of consuming a rot- 
ten chicken disguised as a special dish or delicacy. Many domestic producers 126  Roque B. Ferniindez 
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went into bankruptcy,  which  in turn reduced the supply of  the right kind of 
chickens that people would like to consume. 
The government also determined a wage policy  in an attempt to control 
salaries according to price inflation. In October 1987 the economic authorities 
increased the minimum wage by 75% (from 200 to 300 australs per month) 
and increased general wages, in both the private and public sectors as well as 
in pensions by 12%. Yet the average real wage decreased, which raised angry 
complaints by labor union leaders who called several labor strikes. Toward the 
middle of  1988 a general strike by public-sector utilities workers ended with 
a severe disorder in the Plaza de Mayo and several acts of  vandalism in down- 
town Buenos Aires. Then labor union leaders asked for the resignation of the 
economic minister. 
As in  previous  stabilization plans, the government did not  reduce public 
spending and tried to close the fiscal budget by borrowing and increasing the 
tax burden. But, borrowing  in the capital market meant severe crowding out 
and high real interest  rates,  therefore,  the government opted to use “forced 
borrowing.” 
This measure implied that the government obtained from tax payers a man- 
datory loan equivalent to 40% of last period revenue from income tax and net 
assets tax. First introduced in 1985186 as an emergency measure, forced bor- 
rowing was reintroduced  in  1987, affecting again government credibility and 
reputation. 
The government increased the fiscal burden by raising the tax on imports, 
cigarettes, and checking accounts. This last particular tax-a  true innovation 
in fiscal policy-charged  current accounts each time the account was debited. 
To  avoid tax evasion check endorsements were restricted. The tax was paid by 
current account holders, and commercial banks acted as a withholding agent 
for the government. 
Fiscal experts cannot figure out the rationale for a checking account tax, 
but the secretary of  the treasury,  who proposed  this tax, claimed to have a 
good explanation: “It was well known that neutral taxes are very high in Ar- 
gentina, therefore, there is much evasion and [many] tax exemptions. So, tax 
revenue is low in relation to the level of taxes. But, black market operations, 
exempted operations, and evaders, all  use checks; therefore, taxing checks 
increases revenues and improves the neutrality of the system.” The flaw in this 
explanation is that all checks are taxed, and people who do pay taxes do use 
checks. The explanation would be right only if eluders and evaders were more 
intensive users of checks than regular taxpayers. 
A  new  element in  the economic policy  undertaken  during  1987 was the 
liberalization  of the exchange market. This was not a full liberalization  be- 
cause there were two markets: the official market for commercial operations 
and the financial market for everything else. But the recognition  of this last 
market  ended  with  several  years  of  ineffective  restrictions  to stop capital 
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Jointly with the liberalization of exchange markets came an announcement 
of new commercial policy. Import restrictions would gradually be eliminated: 
the  intention  was  to  improve  resource  allocation,  not  to  engage  in  arm- 
twisting measures designed to force entrepreneurs to keep prices low. 
The  commercial  policy  measures  were  two.  First,  nontariff  restrictions 
were substituted by a system based upon indifference tariffs, which, suppos- 
edly,  would  eliminate  redundant  protection.  Second, temporary  admission 
was granted to all kinds of inputs. These measures were very weak in relation 
to the level of effective protection but they were in the right direction. 
Another favorable event was an improvement in Argentina’s terms of trade, 
which  was used  to launch  another economic  plan  known  as the  Primavera 
Plan. 
5.2.2  From the Primavera Plan to the Hyperinflation 
“Primavera”  means  “spring  season”  in  Spanish, and  that  was  the  name 
given by the press to the economic plan introduced months before the spring 
of  1988. 
Argentina’s favorable terms of trade were mostly due to the drought in the 
northern hemisphere that increased the international price of some agricultural 
commodities.  Table 5.2 presents the monthly  evolution of nominal  and real 
exchange rates, which in July  1988-when  the Primavera Plan started-was 
at  1 13.3. This was a figure lower than the levels of the previous months, but 
it was a profitable level for soybeans and other crops of the season. 
The Primavera Plan allowed the government to realize a profit in  the ex- 
change operations. The proceeds from exports were obtained at a lower com- 
mercial exchange rate and were sold at a higher rate in the financial market. 
Table 5.2 shows that, during several months, the spread between the financial 
rate and the commercial rate exceeded  20%. To  sell dollars in the financial 
market the Central  Bank fixed a minimum  value about  which  it  would  sell 
foreign exchange, although not in unlimited amounts. The amount announced 
was large enough to affect the price of the dollar in the short run. 
Although not explicitly stated, a second intention of the government was to 
influence inflationary expectations affecting the path of the dollar in the free 
market. Other measures attempting to affect inflation were the following: first, 
a price agreement with trade unions to keep the rate of inflation in the order of 
3%-4% per month in September and following months.  On the other hand, 
and as a part of the agreement, the government offered to decrease the value 
added tax by 3%. 
Second, government and trade union representatives created a Price Com- 
mission to follow up prices and costs as well as public-sector finances. At the 
beginning of August there was a 30% increase in prices of public-sector utili- 
ties. This increase was thought to be large enough to guarantee the balancing 
of the budget of public enterprises. 





























































Nominal Free  Real Exchange 
Exchange Rate  Rate 
1987: 
30.77  January  108.8 
40.51  February  110.0 
50.05  March  113.8 
54.62  April  111.3 
64.90  May  110.7 
69.28  June  110.8 
75.55  July  110.9 
98.19  August  110.0 
113.25  September  109.9 
122.23  October  120.3 
166.91  November  120.9 
180.79  December  121.6 
1988: 
240.00  January  122.2 
317.25  February  121.7 
402.93  March  119.9 
527.38  April  119.8 
619.14  May  117.9 
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inal wages, and employees of the central government administration received 
a salary increase of 25%. 
Fourth, commercial policy measures included the intention to reduce tax on 
exports for 500  products and to eliminate nontariff restrictions on 3,000 prod- 
ucts. Nontariff restrictions  were introduced during the Malvinas War  (1982) 
and later with a special provision (Annex 11,  1983) and were never removed 
during the Alfonsin administration. 
Fifth, all reserve requirements  for different kinds of deposits were substi- 
tuted  by  two  special  government  obligations  denoted  “A- 1241”  and  “A- 
1242,” according to the Central Bank resolutions that created them. Although 
I have liberally used the denomination of “reserve requirements” to give a first 
approximation  to the idea, a word of caution is necessary.  A large part of 
reserve requirements were not “reserves,” as banks could not cash them. They 
were special bonds (or nondisposable deposits in the Central Bank) that sub- 
stituted for reserve requirements. 
The government  obligations  A- 1241 and A- 1242 were remunerated  with 
the average deposit rate of commercial banks plus 0.5% monthly. This meant 
that a large part of commercial banks assets were a particular bond that, on 
average, would pay whatever average interest rate the commercial banks were 
willing to pay depositors. 
For example, if  depositors were afraid of  a devaluation  they would try to 
cash deposits to buy dollars. Bankers, to avoid a decrease in deposits, would 
increase the deposit rate, which in turn would imply a higher interest  in A- 
1241 and A-1242. If expectations of  a fiscal deficit were what generated the 
expectation of a devaluation, then a devaluation would occur even with fiscal 
surplus. An overall deficit would always occur as interest accruals on most of 
the domestic debt were indexed to panics. 
Although some measures implemented with the Primavera Plan were in the 
right direction-especially  the exchange rate liberalization and the commer- 
cial policy-the  plan did not succeed. Fiscal reform was not realized, and the 
perverse dynamics of the remuneration of most of the domestic debt drove the 
system to accelerating inflation. Table 5.3  shows that inflation decreased from 
27.6% in August to 5.7% in November 1988. In February 1989-the  turning 
point  to hyperinflation-the  monthly  inflation  rate  was 9.6% and  kept  in- 
creasing to reach a peak of 196.6% in July. 
In  a  general  evaluation  of  the  period  1984-88,  Fernandez  and  Mantel 
(1985, 1988) concluded that price controls-of  the sort introduced with in- 
come policies and heterodox polices-delayed  the adjustment path to steady- 
state equilibrium.  Firms, anticipating price controls in oligopolistic markets, 
set prices higher than they normally would in order to protect themselves from 
the government’s political incentive to fix prices lower than long-run marginal 
costs. With a positive probability of a stabilization failure, firms may be tem- 
porarily better off  with “nonoptimal”  higher prices.  It may perfectly  be the 
case that, if  stabilization  fails the higher price will cushion the firm, for a 
while at least, from “authorized-prices” lower than long-run marginal costs. 131  What Have Populists Learned from Hyperinflation? 
Table 5.3  Argentina: Inflation and Nominal interest Rates 
Inflation in  Average  Inflation in  Average 
Consumer  Depositors  Consumer  Depositors 































































































































































































































Source: INDEC and BCRA. Average interest rate for December 1989 is preliminary. 
A similar argument can be elaborated for nominal and real interest rates. 
These conclusions had three important implications. First, given that delaying 
the adjustment might imply that the real interest rate can remain for a longer 
period at higher values than the long-run natural rate, it is doubtful-at  the 
least-that  price controls can help to avoid the  recessionary effects usually 132  Roque B. Fernandez 
associated with stabilization. Second, higher real rates introduced by a partic- 
ular stabilization plan with  price controls suggest the existence of  short-run 
economic wealth  transfers  across sectors that should be carefully evaluated 
before justifying the “social advantage” of  price controls. Third, price con- 
trols with fiscal lags imply an important delay in the adjustment of the global 
deficit, since its size depends on the magnitude of the real rate of interest and 
of the rate of inflation. 
Although the economic plan failed, the authorities insisted on price controls 
even after the monthly  rates of  inflation  were  well  above  10%. Of course, 
price controls were totally  ineffective,  and a high  inflation accelerated even 
more.  When the  authorities  abandoned  the  idea  of  “heterodox”  economic 
policy-making,  and gradually moved to more orthodox measures such as re- 
duction of  public-sector  deficit and sound monetary management,  it was too 
late. The strong credibility available at the beginning of the Austral Plan was 
gone, and the side effects of orthodox measures in the absence of credibility 
was taking a significant political toll. The lack of  credibility and the fear of 
repudiation of the government debt increased interest rates to levels never seen 
before in Argentina. Government borrowing in the domestic financial system, 
at the  beginning  of  1988, took  place at annual effective rates of  more than 
30% for operations  adjusted  to the  U.S.  dollar;  that  is,  at  four  times  the 
LIBOR rate. 
Structural reform of  the public sector was never given serious consideration 
by  the political  authorities.  There were  timid  attempts at deregulation  and 
privatization, and when they wanted to be more effective on structural reform 
it was too late; they awoke in the middle of the hyperinflation. 
5.3  The Administration of Hyperinflation 
During the  second half of  1988 inflation was kept under control with the 
Central Bank auctioning dollars in the free market.  But a growing debt and 
the political  campaign for the presidential elections, which would be held in 
May 1989, were the dominant forces driving the economy. 
Advertising  during a  political  campaign  may  have  different  forms,  and 
many of these forms can be inconsequential for economic developments. But 
the form chosen by the ruling party had severe consequences for the adminis- 
tration of the economic crisis. 
Toward the end of  1988 the polls showed a clear advantage for the opposi- 
tion candidate. The political advertisement of the ruling party characterized 
the opposition candidate as representing “chaos.” Therefore,  the situation in 
Argentina at the beginning of 1989 was a ruling party driving the economy to 
increasing inflation and an opposition party that represented future chaos. 
The chaos exploded for the ruling party as soon as 6 February  1989, when 
the exchange rate policy became unsustainable and the economic authorities 
introduced the following modifications. First, they devalued the commercial 133  What Have Populists Learned from Hyperinflation'? 
exchange rate by 2.5% to 14.45 australs per U.S. dollar and announced  an 
additional devaluation of 6%  for the rest of  the month. Second, they created a 
new differential exchange rate 25% higher than the commercial rate to trade 
special goods and services. Third, the Central Bank ceased to intervene in the 
free  market  by  auctioning foreign exchange.  Fourth, the  Central  Bank  re- 
leased 6,500 million australs worth (about 11% of the monetary base) of  re- 
serve requirements  in the form of nondisposable deposits (previously created 
by Central Bank Resolution A- 1324). 
The run against the austral continued, and the economic authorities were 
forced to introduce new measures almost every week. Some important mea- 
sures include the following. The two official commercial exchange rates were 
unified in a single official rate. Imports and exports of goods, and also interest 
corresponding to the financing  of  commercial operations, were  exchanged 
50% at the official rate and 50% at the free market rate. Services were allowed 
100% at the free market rate. 
The financial problems caused by  the run against the austral induced the 
monetary  authorities  to create every  financial  asset that  could  possibly  be 
imagined. Irrespective of its cost, the government issued anything the public 
would be willing to hold. Therefore, the Central Bank, by means of Resolu- 
tion A-1388, created five new bonds indexed to: the free exchange rate, the 
stock market quotation of BONEX (a Treasury bond in U.S. dollars), the ex- 
change rate for imports, the greater of  either the consumer price index or the 
nominal interest rate, the greater of either the free exchange rate or the nomi- 
nal  interest rate. A special deposit indexed to the price of  crops, was also 
created for producers and exporters (Central Bank Resolution A- 1391). 
Several people and financial institutions took "advantage"  of these options; 
but later, such advantages could not be realized, as the government was unable 
to honor them. Other people, understanding the nature of the Ponzi scheme in 
which the government was involved, decided to buy U.S. dollars in the free 
market, driving up their price and forcing the government to take new actions. 
On 13 April  1989, the government decided that all transactions in the offi- 
cial exchange rate market were transferred to the free market. Exports were 
taxed at a floating rate computed as the difference between the free market 
exchange rate and a reference price of 36 australs per U.S. dollar. Reference 
prices  would  be modified  periodically. The government  also decided  to  in- 
crease by  14% the price of public utilities and by  16% the price of gasoline. 
Income policy remained unchanged. 
Inflation, which in March 1989 was  17% monthly, could not be mitigated. 
It doubled to 33.4% in April and more than doubled to 78.5% in May. This 
was  the  month  when  general  elections were  held, elections  that  the ruling 
party lost. 
From May to 10 December-the  constitutional date to transfer the power- 
the ruling party was supposed to manage the Argentine economy. A very dif- 
ficult task if  the official pronouncement was right in characterizing the next 134  Roque B. Fernandez 
government  as representing  “chaos.”  The ruling  party  tried  at  all  costs  to 
transfer the government immediately, something that the opposition party did 
not want. Therefore, the ruling party lacked alternatives other than to manage 
the hyperinflation. 
There is an abundant literature explaining  the  failure of  heterodox  plans 
designed to try to stop inflation in Argentina, but there is no literature analyz- 
ing heterodox measures to manage hyperinflation. From May to July  1989 I 
have the empirical evidence of a populist government using heterodox  mea- 
sures to stop hyperinflation. Of course, hyperinflation accelerated. 
In May the government introduced the following measures.  First, the eco- 
nomic authorities announced new taxes on durable goods (real estate and au- 
tomobiles) and increases in prices of public utilities and gasoline. Second, the 
payment of forced savings and other fiscal obligations were claimed in ad- 
vance. Third, the minimum wage was increased to 4,000 australs (the equiva- 
lent to $23 monthly in U.S. currency at the official exchange rate at the end of 
May).  Prices  were  frozen  for  almost  all  goods  except  fruits, vegetables, 
meats, and fish and other seafood. 
Plain figures perhaps are not the best indicators of the nature of the difficul- 
ties during the period April-July  1989. To illustrate the drama of hyperinfla- 
tion the following paragraphs give a special timetable of financial restrictions 
affecting  depositors, financial  institutions,  exchange  houses,  and  the  stock 
market. 
April 3 and 4 were mandatory banking and exchange holidays; April 17, an 
exchange holiday but a working day for financial transactions. April 28 was a 
mandatory banking and exchange holiday. 
May 2 was a mandatory exchange holiday. May 22, 23, and 24 were man- 
datory banking and exchange holidays.  Bank withdrawals were restricted  to 
20,000 australs  in each bank  account.  May  26 and 29 were mandatory ex- 
change and banking holidays.  May 30, withdrawals from time deposits and 
acceptances  were restricted  to 40,000 australs.  Balances in  excess of  with- 
drawals were restructured to become due seven days later. 
June 6: bank withdrawals were restricted to up to 50,000 australs for any 
type  of  operation. On June  9, the  withdrawal  restriction  was  increased  to 
1  00,000 aus  trals . 
Exchange controls were reintroduced,  fixing the exchange rate toward the 
end of May. The Central Bank would buy each U.S. dollar at 175 australs and 
would sell it at 177 australs.  Buying or selling foreign exchange outside the 
official regulated  market  was considered  a misdemeanor,  and, according to 
legislation, it would be punished through a special criminal law for exchange 
operations. 
Yet  there  was  another  law  that  authorized  the  exchange of  BONEXs by 
foreign exchange and BONEXs by australs. Triangulation through BONEXs 
replicated  a free market  for foreign exchange, and that  was how  the  most 
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monetary authorities decided, Argentina was operating in an unrestricted mar- 
ket for financial operation in foreign exchange at ‘least since  1978 when the 
BONEXs were introduced for the first time. 
The hyperinflation  measured as the rate of devaluation of the austral in the 
free market reached its peak of 186.4% per month in June. If measured with 
the consumer price index the peak is in July with 196.6% monthly. 
The severity  of  hyperinflation  and the danger of  social unrest forced the 
elected government to accept an immediate transfer of  power. A new populist 
administration took power on 9 July and insisted on price controls, although 
not everything was heterodoxy in the BB Plan. 
5.4  The Menem Administration and the BB Plan 
The announcements of the new administration were a mix of  heterodox and 
orthodox doctrines. On the one hand, the heterodox idea of having an income 
policy was always present from the very beginning. But on the other hand, the 
rhetoric and the appointment of high ranking officials tended to be orthodox. 
As I construct this discussion,  I have doubts about how to classify the policy- 
making of the period July-December  1989, I would not call it heterodox  be- 
cause the problems of the budget constraint of the public sector were given 
serious attention even though they were not provided serious solutions. Nei- 
ther would  I call  the policy-making  orthodox  because policymakers  firmly 
believed that price “agreements” were effective to deal with inflation. 
The first plan of  the Menem administration was the BB Plan. Here, “BB” 
means Bunge Born Corporation, the multinational firm that provided the gov- 
ernment with a high-ranking executive to take the post of economic minister. 
The political rhetoric was very impressive and unexpected from a populist 
leader.  President  Menem  announced  a  program  of  privatization  of  almost 
everything  that  could  be transferred  to private  hands.  The Argentine Tele- 
phone Company, ENTEL, was scheduled for privatization during  1990. Two 
TV channels owned by the state were privatized toward the end of  1989. Oil 
exploration and exploitation was subject to privatization and, in less than 90 
days, Argentina signed a standby agreement with the IMF. Table 5.4  summa- 
rizes  the  projection  of  public  finance of  the BB Plan  and  its relation  with 
previous years. 
The preliminary figures for 1989 indicated that the overall deficit decreased 
1.6% of GDP from 1988 to 1989. A further reduction was expected for 1990 
according to budgetary projections. 
The BB Plan was effective at stopping the hyperinflation of the moment and 
reaching inflation  levels of one digit per month during September, October, 
and November.  But in December the Argentine economy was again heading 
for hyperinflation with the monthly rate of 40.1% in the consumer price index. 
The evidence available so far does not support the hypothesis of a fiscally 
driven high inflation process toward the end of  1989. During the months fol- 136  Roque B. Fernandez 
Table 5.4  Argentina: Public Finances as a Percentage of GDP 
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
Public-sector operational 
Central Bank quasi- 
Overall public-sector 
deficit  8.0  4.8  2.4  4.8  5.0  6.2  -.I 
fiscal deficit  2.5  2.8  1.1  .9  1.4  1.4  1.5 
deficit  10.5  7.7  3.5  5.7  6.4  4.8  I .4 
Source: Ministerio de Economia and BCRA. 
Nore: All figures measured on cash basis.  The table reflects  preliminary figures  for  1989 and 
budget estimates for 1990. 
lowing  the  hyperinflation,  the  Central  Bank  did  not  issue  any  significant 
amount of money to cover the operating expenses of the public sector. Most 
of the monetary  emission  of the period  was generated by  the  purchases of 
foreign exchange by  part of the Central Bank  (some of  it  was used  to pay 
international organizations).  Part of the monetary emission was sterilized is- 
suing CEDEPS or short-term Central Bank debt. 
This new debt  was  issued  at very  high  nominal  rates.  Given  that  it was 
announced to keep a fixed exchange rate of 650 australs per U.S.  dollar up to 
the end of 1990, in the period from July to October the average yield of finan- 
cial assets was more than 15% monthly in U.S. dollars. This seemed not to be 
a serious problem for bankers or depositors because most of  the money was 
lent to the government, which remunerated average reserve requirements of 
about 80% of private bank deposits. 
All indexed debt created by Resolution A-1388 (see sec. 5.3) that became 
due in the second half of  1989 was compulsorily reprogrammed with a new 
bond called BOCON. 
Even the most  naive  of  depositors  knew  that the situation  could not  last 
long, and, at a given point in time, he or she would consider it reasonable to 
convert austral deposits to U.S. dollars. In a few months a few smart deposi- 
tors could realize in Argentina a gain that would take almost a decade to ob- 
tain in the world financial market. Of course, not all could realize such a gain. 
It was the attempt of many to capitalize on such a gain that promoted the run 
on the financial system and led to hyperinflation. 
I believe that, more than fiscal disarray, debt dynamics is the simpler and 
more powerful explanation of the hyperinflations  of  1989, with one episode 
beginning in February and the other starting in October, but being aborted in 
January  1990. Hyperinflation  was  aborted  by  a  compulsive  conversion  of 
most of the short-term domestic debt to a long-term debt in the form of a new 
series of BONEX. 
Table 5.5 shows the evolution of monetary and debt aggregates. Notice that 
the last column of the table correctly predicts the demonetization process of 137  What Have Populists Learned from Hyperinflation'! 
Table 5.5  Argentina: Monetary and Domestic Debt Aggregates 
BCRA  Total of 
Debt in  Austral Debt  Share Debt 
































































































































































































































































Source: Curta Economicu. 
Note: Monetary aggregates in proportion to GDP, debt aggregates in millions of  U.S. dollars. 138  Roque B. Fernandez 
hyperinflations. The last column measures the share of  nonindexed debt de- 
nominated in australs but eming  a substantial nominal interest rate. As gov- 
ernment’s debts are private-sector assets, and as the private sector decided to 
shift from australs to dollars, a run began leading to hyperinflation. Notice the 
turning points in February and October 1989 where the share of  the austral 
debt leads any of  the monetary aggregates. 
Sometimes in the standard financial programming exercises an increase in 
M1 suggests credibility and monetization of the economy. The empirical evi- 
dence for 1989 does not confirm this interpretation, and there may be some 
instances-as  will be explained in the next section-where  monetization is 
achieved by increasing the real interest rates. 
5.5  Economic Policy and High Inflation 
There are two topics in monetary theory that deserve special attention in 
high inflation environments. One is the case of “unpleasant monetarist arith- 
metic” that deals with the policy dilemma of  financing deficits by  printing 
money or by  printing bonds. The other is the problem of  time inconsistency 
and the existence of nominal bonds in private hands. 
5.5.1  Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic 
Sargent and Wallace (1  98 1) ask what would happen if the government de- 
cided to decrease the share of  the deficit financed with money creation. By 
itself this would tend to decrease inflation. But if the government is expected 
to shift to full money creation later, lower money creation means faster tran- 
sitory accumulation of debt and higher money creation in the future. Antici- 
pations of higher money creation in the future imply higher inflation today. 
With a positive constant real interest rate, a higher debt means higher inter- 
est payments in the steady state. If the economy is on the left side of the Laffer 
curve, an increase in  the stock of  debt implies a higher inflation tax in the 
steady state. However, if the economy is on the right side of the Laffer curve, 
a higher debt will require a lower inflation and the Sargent and Wallace prop- 
osition would not hold. 
When the assumption of a constant interest rate for different levels of gov- 
ernment debt is replaced by the assumption that higher debt is associated with 
higher real interest rates, higher inflation is obtained on both sides of the Laf- 
fer curve. This can be verified with the following set of  relationships (see 
Fernbdez 1990, for an optimization model with a liquidity constraint provid- 
ing the micro-foundations for this subject). 
The government financial policy dilemma is represented by  the following 
steady-state relationships: 
(1)  a.6.r = men, 
(2)  (1 -a)-b.r = s. 139  What Have Populists Learned from Hyperinflation'? 
The first relationship is the share (a)  of  the quasi-fiscal deficit (that is, the 
deficit generated just by the real interest on government debt) that is financed 
by  inflation. The second relationship is the share (1 -a)  of the quasi-fiscal 
deficit that is paid with the primary surplus s. 
Let +(IT)  = m/b  be the proportion of real money yielding no interest to the 
stock of  real government debt with d(+)/d.rr < 0. In the particular case of 
Argentina, m corresponds to the definition of real M 1 and b can be considered 
bonds and deposits yielding interest. Deposits are government obligations be- 
cause of the high reserve requirements remunerated at competitive rates by the 
Central Bank. Let b = b(r, IT) with dbldr > 0 and db/dIT < 0. Substitute this 
relationship in (1) and (2) to obtain 
(3)  r = (l/(w)*+(n).IT, 
(4)  b(c  IT).^ = ~/(l  -a). 
Assume that IT.+(IT) is increasing in IT  < IT'  and decreasing in IT for IT  > 
IT'. This implies that, if the stock of  bonds b(*)  were a constant or independent 
of  IT  and r (as in most of the literature on inflation tax), the graph of seignor- 
age revenue against the inflation rate would have the usual Laffer curve prop- 
erty. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates relationships (3)  and (4). Fernkndez (1990) shows, in 
a model where the dynamics are explicitly specified, that the line representing 
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(4) must  cut  from  below  the  line representing  (3) to obtain a  saddle-point 
equilibrium; otherwise the system is unstable. 
A decrease in a  implies an upward shift in (3) and a rightward shift in (4) 
and, as shown by figure 5.2, I obtain a solution with higher inflation irrespec- 
tive of whether the economy is on the left side or on the right side of the Laffer 
curve (see points A’ and B’). 
What this analysis tells us is that the crowding-out effect on the service of 
government debt by increasing borrowing produces higher inflation. The im- 
pact of higher borrowing  on the stock of  debt and on real interest requires 
more inflation to pay for it than the alternative of not borrowing. The alterna- 
tive of just printing money to pay for debt services produces less inflation than 
the alternative of paying a lower share but of  a higher total debt service in- 
creased by borrowing. 
Notice that the old remedy to stop inflation, that is, by reducing deficits or 
by increasing primary surplus, works nicely on either side of the Laffer curve. 
This result  constrasts  with  previous  literature,  where  this  inflation  remedy 
would work only on the left side of the Laffer curve. 
5.5.2  The Problem of Time Consistency of Optimal Plans 
A  textbook  risk-free  government  bond  paying  low  interest  is  a  concept 
found  in  textbooks  but  not  in  Argentina’s  financial  markets.  Governments 
with poor reputations  cannot issue risk-free bonds. So, we wonder,  when  a 
government loses its reputation how can it be regained? Starting from a posi- 
tive debt, the real interest cost to build up one’s reputation might be too high 
Inflation 
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to afford. Perhaps if debt is canceled or substantially reduced through hyper- 
inflation, repudiation, or reprogramming, the social cost is lower than collect- 
ing distorting taxes to pay for debt services. Perhaps it is higher. These are 
topics that should be carefully analyzed, and I have not been able to find defi- 
nite answers to all these questions. Below, however,  I will venture some an- 
swers. 
In policy discussions in Argentina, Ricardo Arriazu (Arriazu, Leone, and 
Murphy 1988) emphasized the necessity of a careful analysis of government 
financial wealth before considering a change in the stabilization policy of the 
late seventies. That policy consisted of a preannouncement  of future devalua- 
tions in an attempt to reduce inflationary expectations. 
Eventually  that policy produced a revaluation of  the peso. To correct the 
revaluation, a series of devaluations were introduced in 198 1 that accelerated 
inflation and caused a deterioration of the financial wealth of the government. 
Those results tend to confirm Arriazu's  conjectures  and suggest that before 
changing policy the government should pay special attention to the composi- 
tion and the time structure of claims and liabilities. 
The failure to understand this point may imply that to correct a real distor- 
tion-a  real appreciation of the peso-a  greater distortion is introduced.  In 
other words, if inflation must increase, the government should first try to re- 
structure the debt toward long-term nominal claims at fixed interest rates. Un- 
fortunately, as time consistency analysis emphasizes, it would be very hard to 
find private agents willing to accept such unhedged restructuring,  as Resolu- 
tions A- 124  1, A- 1242, and A- 1388 and the general experience of  1988 and 
1989 confirmed in Argentina. Those resolutions were issued to provide fully 
hedged positions to financial investors. 
The success of time consistency analysis to explain some important issues 
of  stabilization  is not because populists are inconsistent,  either because they 
do not know economic theory or because they commit obvious policy  mis- 
takes. If  neutral taxes are unavailable governments  would tend to maximize 
social  benefits,  repudiating  debt either through  taxes, inflation,  reprogram- 
ming, or the  like. Yet, if  this were the case, why  would rational people in 
populist countries hold nominal debt? 
It could be the case that nominal bonds yield liquidity services (as assumed 
in Fernandez 1990) or that people hold nominal debt if they can fully hedge 
it. Hedging a nominal bond could be implicit; for example, tax deferrals or 
fiscal lags are good hedges against jumps in the price level. Also it could be 
the case that in countries like Argentina, where the stock of nonindexed do- 
mestic  debt  is  substantially  less than  10% of  GDP,  tax  deferrals and the 
Olivera-Tanzi effect of  fiscal lags might imply a zero-net-present-value nomi- 
nal debt. 
I have tried to analyze this topic elsewhere (e.g., Fernandez 1989a, 1989b). 
Working  with  the  original  Lucas-Stokey  cash-in-advance  framework,  the 
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forward. But is a zero-net-present-value nominal debt time inconsistent? In a 
model  with  money  in the utility  function as used by Persson,  Persson,  and 
Svensson (1987), Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) show that zero-net-present-value 
for nominal  debt does not solve the time inconsistency problem (see refer- 
ences for other results on time inconsistency). I obtained the same results for 
a cash-in-advance model. 
However, another result follows. For example, a policy able to produce a 
shift from a government net-positive-nominal debt to a net-negative-nominal 
debt can be made time consistent.  Also, time consistency might be achieved 
in  several cases where  individual  agents are not deprived of  volition  at the 
stage of nominal assets restructuring. 
A very important underlying assumption in the time inconsistency  results 
is that governments may restructure, at will, all real and nominal obligations 
at market prices,  and economic agents will passively accept such restructur- 
ing. If this is not so, as some available evidence on private-sector  behavior 
incurring in fiscal lags and tax deferrals suggests, the problem under discus- 
sion becomes a true differential  game where time inconsistent solutions are 
more difficult to obtain. 
The compulsive  reprogramming  of the domestic debt at the beginning of 
January  1990 as an  alternative  way  to avoid  hyperinflation  in Argentina  is 
perhaps the most interesting case to analyze this type of problem. Obviously, 
if  people  would  have  willingly  accepted  restructuring,  compulsion  would 
have not been necessary. This occurred in January  1990, and it is too soon to 
evaluate the results and the future consequences of such policy action. But it 
will certainly be the subject of my future research. 
5.6  Conclusions 
The question we raised at the outset was, Can populist  governments stop 
high  inflation?  If  the  answer  were  yes,  developing  nations  like  Argentina 
might be able to grow again. If the answer is no, stagnation and the risk of 
hyperinflation seem the natural outcome. 
Populist governments used to approach economics by emphasizing income 
redistribution and paying little attention to deficit finance and the risk of  hy- 
perinflation. The experience I have analyzed seems to suggest that the populist 
approach to economic policy has failed to achieve even a minimum improve- 
ment  in  the  well-being  of  low-income  people.  Traditional  political  parties 
have not disappeared from electoral competition, but they are in a process of 
aggiornamento and rationalization of their later experiences. 
Populist leaders learned that they were wrong when they believed that tran- 
sitory stabilization through price controls was a necessary condition to carry 
out the reform of the public sector. They thought of transitory stabilization as 
buying time for a structural reform that, in the future, would result in a sound I43  Mi hat tidke Populist5 Learned troiii Hyperinflation ’ 
and  permanent  monetary  and  fiscal  policy.  But  they never  had  the time to 
reach the future. They also learned  that  the transformation  of public-sector 
enterprises  and  institutional  behavior  of local  and provincial  governments 
were prerequisites  to stabilization.  The failure of  Argentina’s Austral Plan, 
Primavera Plan, and BB Plan were the learning experiences. 
After decades of  failures, governments of  any type lose their credibility, 
and  transitory  stabilization  with  heterodox  measures  increases  real  interest 
rates and the burden of the domestic debt which, in turn, builds up pressures 
for a new inflation burst. The problem of high inflation is usually the problem 
of an oversized public sector and fiscal disarray. Any program that does not 
immediately  attack these two problems will almost surely fail. It remains to 
be seen, at least in Argentina, whether a successful heterodox plan is possible. 
Heterodoxy has failed, not because all heterodox plans are wrong or illogical, 
but because those that were employed were used to postpone reforms of the 
public sector that had been badly needed for several decades. 
What populist leaders have also learned is that not all the problems facing a 
country like Argentina are the result of  naive income policies or the govem- 
ment spending too much. Domestic debt, credibility, financial runs, and pol- 
icy mistakes are almost as important as naive populism. 
The change  in  the populist  approach  of  basing  stabilization  on deficit- 
ridden  income policies is a necessary  condition for price stability. It is also 
necessary  to  start the stabilization  with well-known  fundamental reforms in 
the  public  sector.  Any  delay in  taking  these  measures  is seen as a lack of 
political  will  and deteriorates even  more the low credibility  of  the  govern- 
ment.  Finally, careful attention must be paid to domestic debt dynamics that 
can easily jeopardize any serious attempt at stabilization.  It may be the case 
that domestic debt restructuring is necessary to assure the stability in financial 
markets. 
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Comment  Jose De Gregorio 
In my remarks  I want to focus on the following issues: First, there are two 
kinds of policy failures, those where the announced plan does not work and 
those where the plan is aborted before all the measures are implemented. The 
former case is the most relevant, and I want to stress that the key issue is not 
what the missing  component was rather  than  why it was actually missing. 
Second, I will  concentrate  on the timing of a disinflation. There is tension 
between  the  stabilization  shock, which  may  include monetary  reform,  in- 
comes policies,  and so on, and the long-run transformation required  to live 
with lower inflation. Then I will refer to the relevance of incomes policies as 
a component of a stabilization program.  This is an old discussion but in this 
case important to address in light of Fernandez’s claims. 
Why Are Stabilizations Abandoned? 
It is not puzzling to see that many stabilization programs end up failing. In 
Argentina this  is the case in all three programs analyzed in the paper.  The 
disturbing issue is not what were the measures not undertaken during the sta- 
bilization  but rather why they were not implemented in spite of the fact that 
they may have been announced. 
On the reasons for the program’s failure there is enough evidence showing 
that the lack of fiscal adjustment was the main reason. However, there is little 
work on why the fiscal adjustment was not carried out. I want to discuss some 
of the possible explanations. 
We could argue that the policymakers are “ignorant populists.” This may be 
true not only for this vaguely defined species called “populist.” This seems the 
explanation underlying Fernandez paper.  Unfortunately the answer is not as 
simple as to send policymakers to study macroeconomics.  Especially  in Ar- 
gentina, where  most economists  had  the chance to stop inflation,  they cer- 
tainly are not ignorant. At a deeper level it is not an attractive assumption to 
consider that private  agents make rational decisions while governments are 
completely  irrational.  In the particular case of the Austral  Plan,  Fernandez 
mentions that Alfonsin promised not to create money to finance the budget. 
Hence, we can discard the “ignorance hypothesis.” 
An alternative hypothesis is that the program had bad luck (bad terms of 
trade) or a lack of credibility (reforms that were not believable). The problem 
with these explanations is that programs fail without being completely imple- 
mented. Governments abandon stabilization plans before they are able to see 
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whether they will be successful. The Austral Plan started with a large degree 
of support, so the lack of credibility is also not a serious issue.’ 
Finally, I think the most plausible reason for program failure is that some 
institutional and political factors impose severe constraints on the completion 
of the program. The costs that the government has to bear, if they stick to the 
original plan, are so high that they prefer to abort it. I will develop an example 
that looks consistent with the Argentinean experience.* 
Let us consider the Austral Plan. It has everything needed for success, es- 
pecially unprecedented popular support. Despite the fact that the plan worked 
for some period, the deep roots of  inflation were not eliminated. 
Why was Alfonsin’s economic team unable, although they may have been 
willing,  to make the fiscal correction?  It is possible that they did not know 
how difficult it would be to implement a fiscal reform. After the first stages of 
the plan  were implemented, they  realized  that the  required adjustment was 
more  substantive  than  they  had  originally  expected.  They  could  not  find 
enough political  willingness,  in  the Congress or in the political  parties,  to 
support the adjustment  needed  to carry  forward the required reforms.3 The 
cost that the government would have to bear alone would have been too high 
to make continuing worth the effort. Hence they prefer to administer the crisis 
in the hope of better luck in the future. 
All  further attempts  to stop inflation  are condemned  to fail  unless  there 
exists a broad consensus among the main  interest  groups to support funda- 
mental economic reform. The costs the country has to pay in order to reach 
this stage are enormous. Menem’s first attempt to incorporate radicals into the 
government shows that the search for an agreement is considered important. 
What Should Come First: The Fiscal Reform or the Short-Run Shock? 
An interesting discussion raised by  Fernandez is the question of  the fiscal 
reform and its timing. A summary of his point is that proponents of the Aus- 
1. The evolution of interest rates also shows that successful programs are not necessarily those 
that had the most credibility. In some sense, credibility came later. On a recent failed stabilization 
in Ireland and its contrast with PoincarC in France in 1926, see R. Dornbusch, “Credibility, Debt, 
and Unemployment: Ireland’s Failed Stabilization” (Economic  Policy 8 [ 19891: 174-201).  For a 
discussion of  the Bolivian hyperinflation,  see J. Sachs, “The Bolivian Hyperinflation” (NBER 
Working Paper no. 2073, Cambridge, Mass.,  1986). In the Argentinean case the large drop of 
nominal interest rates in the months following the Austral Plan shows that the plan did not lack 
credibility. 
2. In “Why Stabilizations Are Delayed’ (Mimeograph, 1989). A. Alesina and A. Drazen model 
the delay of stabilization as a concession game among different interest groups. Nevertheless, my 
example will suggest that the stabilization will come when everybody agrees to share the burden 
of stabilization rather than when a particular group concedes and bears the entire cost of stabili- 
zation. Another related model is discussed by  R. Fernendez and D. Rodrik, “Why Is Trade Re- 
form So Unpopular?’ (CEPR Discussion Paper Series, No. 391, March 1990). 
3. A simple formalization of this point is that there is uncertainty about the Olivera-Tanzi effect. 
Therefore, when inflation is reduced they realized that the fiscal adjustment has to be greater than 
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tral  Plan  would argue that the plan was a necessary condition for a serious 
discussion on the budget issue. The opponents of the plan thought that a pre- 
condition of implementation should have been a transformation of the public 
sector. 
There are at least two reasons why  the stabilization should start with the 
anti-inflationary shock. It is necessary to know how the economy will look 
like with low inflation to have a good sense of the magnitude of the reform. 
Also, the recovery  of seignorage after the remonetization generates enough 
revenues while better taxation is designed. 
These seem the reasons why Daniel Heymann and Stanley Fischer, in their 
analysis of the Austral Plan and the Israeli stabilization of 1985, support this 
timing. The last paragraphs of their respective discussions are: 
Still high  inflation  and  stagnation  are more than  occasional problems  in 
Argentina.  Longer-run  changes  . . . seem necessary  to overcome them. 
The stabilization program has stimulated a debate within the country that 
may, hopefully, produce some agreement on such reforms. 
Second, the economy  needs major  structural reforms.  The ending of  in- 
flation was a necessary  precondition  for dealing with the economy’s real 
problem.4 
However there are also reasons why starting with a structural reform may 
be preferred.  It can help to avoid time consistency problems of the fiscal re- 
form. The increase in seignorage has the disadvantage in that it reduces the 
incentive to undertake the “deep reform,” then the reform may be time incon- 
sistent. It is also possible that after many failed attempts to stop inflation the 
effectiveness  of new short-run programs is diminished.  The endogenous ac- 
commodation  of  the economy to high inflation will make stabilization very 
difficult. 
It seems that in Argentina today to reduce inflation it is first necessary to 
press for a deep reform of the public sector. Short-run attempts have all failed, 
and it is unlikely that a new one will succeed. 
However, before classifying the Austral Plan as a useless program we have 
to ask: Would it have been possible to implement a deep fiscal reform before 
the  Austral  Plan? If  Alfonsin’s  team did not succeed with the high level of 
support he had when the plan started, it is extremely unlikely that they would 
have succeeded in bringing public-sector reform without the anti-inflationary 
shock. If they did not have the incentive andlor the support to carry out that 
enormous and risky  operation  at  the  peak  of  their  popularity,  they  surely 
would have not been able to do it without the Austral Plan. 
Today there is consensus that fiscal reform is essential, and this is the result 
of  the failure of previous attempts.  It seems that disinflation  is like “experi- 
4.  See D. Heymann, “The Austral Plan” (Papers and Proceedings of  the American Economic 
Review [  19871: 284-87)  and S.  Fischer, “The Israeli Stabilization Program” (Ibid., pp. 27-5-78), 148  Roque B. Fernandez 
ence goods” in industrial  organization:  you have to  try  them to  know  their 
quality. You have to try to stabilize to know how difficult it is. 
Incomes Policy Support to Stabilization5 
Fernandez  also raises the question of  whether incomes policies are an im- 
portant component of a stabilization program. He argues that they were a mis- 
take and elsewhere he shows that they only delayed  the “adjustment to the 
steady state.” 
In Argentina, only incomes policies have been implemented. It is obvious 
that they alone are not enough to control inflation. The idea that high inflation 
comes purely as an indexation phenomenon is generally false. There is always 
an ultimate  macroeconomic imbalance that triggers this process.  It is not a 
surprise to find that incomes policies introduce an additional disequilibrium 
when the problem is not entirely resolved. Incomes policies are justified only 
as a complement of a stabilization program that helps to reduce the recessive 
costs of disinflation.  Their failure in Argentina is not a case against incomes 
policies,  but a case in favor of  a complete program.  Otherwise it should be 
necessary to question why stabilization programs that included incomes poli- 
cies have been successful in Israel and Mexico. 
Incomes policies are not a panacea, and they involve some risks that are 
worth mentioning. Relative price distortions are always a problem; however, 
in high inflation they may be a second-order cost. Their most pervasive effect 
is in the pricing strategies of firms that are expecting a price freeze. The ex- 
pectation of  price controls may lead to an overreaction  in the magnitude  of 
price adjustment; this introduces an additional friction into the price dynam- 
ics. New  pricing practices  will emerge in  order to avoid being caught with 
prices too low when the price freeze occurs. A typical example is the existence 
of  rebates.  Firms can have permanently  high quoted prices and then adjust 
them through discounts. Although this pricing mechanism may allow for rel- 
ative price adjustments during a disinflation, it also jeopardizes the effective- 
ness of  a price freeze since firms will be effectively  increasing prices.  This 
may suggest that incomes policies should only focus on the control of few key 
prices and allow the rest to adjust during the disinflation. 
Some Concluding Remarks 
The more a stabilization program is delayed the higher are its recessionary 
costs. The reason  for this  is that, as inflation  remains  high, the macroeco- 
5.  I will not repeat studies on incomes policies instead of  focusing on Femandez’s remarks. For 
extensive discussion of  the subject, see R. Dornbusch and M. Simonsen, lnjation Stabilization 
with lncome Policy Supporr (New York: Group of Thirty, 1987); E. Helpman and L. Leiderman. 
“Stabilization in High inflation Countries: Analytical Foundations and Recent Experience” (Car- 
negie Rochesrer Conference Series on Public Policy 28 [ 19881: 9-84);  M. Kiguel and N. Liviatan 
“Inflationary  Rigidities  and Orthodox Stabilization Policies” (World Bank Economic Review 2 
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nomic fragility is increasing. Sophisticated pricing practices and other ways 
to circumvent price controls emerge. The monetary and financial system also 
become very unstable, which makes it too costly to raise seignorage.6 
The fundamental cause of  inflation is still the budget deficit. The fact that 
the government is following an unsustainable policy weakens the contempo- 
raneous  correlation between  inflation  and  the budget,  which of  course  can 
make even more obscure the design of  a coherent disinflation program.’  Fer- 
nandez discusses other problems, such as the monetarist arithmetic of Sargent 
and Wallace and the time consistency of public debt. All these considerations 
reduce the degrees of  freedom for sound macroeconomic policy and the econ- 
omy accumulates significant losses. Unfortunately these may be the costs that 
trigger the necessary willingness to undertake a serious disinflation effort. 
6. See  J. De  Gregorio,  “Welfare Costs of  Inflation, Seignorage, and  Financial Innovation” 
7. See A. Drazen and E. Helpman, “Inflationary Consequences of Anticipated Macroeconomic 
(MIT. Cambridge, Mass., Mimeograph, 1990). 
Policies” (Review of  Economic Srudies 57 [ 19901: 147-66). 